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“The digitization of just about everything — documents, news, music, photos, video, maps, personal 
updates, social networks, request for information and responses to those requests, data from all kind of 
sensors, and so on — is one of the most important phenomena of recent years.” (Brynjolfsson & 
McAfee, 2014, p. 66). Just as important as digitization is, so imperative is a better understanding of the 
impact of digital technologies on productivity and growth to allow academics, business executives and 
policy makers to foster policy landscapes that embrace the power of these technologies and seize the 
digital opportunity (Crespi, Criscuolo, & Haskel, 2007; Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2010).  
It comes therefore with only little surprise that a large literature aimed at examining the productivity 
effects of investments in information and communication technologies.1 Surprisingly, however, initial 
investigations two decades ago struggled to find any measurable contributions of ICT investments to 
productivity growth (Loveman, 1994; Solow, 1987; Strassmann, 1990) — a conundrum coined the 
‘Productivity Paradox’. While researchers were initially concerned with ICT’s direct role as a 
production technology to improve productivity, more recent work referred to ICT’s role as a 
coordination technology and carefully addressed its indirect linkages to productivity (Dedrick et al., 
2003). These studies resort to organizational complementarity theory based on seminal work by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) who pointed to the beneficial and complex interplay of technology 
with human capital and different organizational practices, structures and processes (often termed 
‘organizational capital’) to yield benefits over and above the effects each element could generate on its 
own. Thus, even if the direct productivity effects of ICT per se might be low – as observed in the initial 
investigations – its effect is expected to increase, when combined with adequate organizational 
practices. Indeed, the empirical evidence for the complementarity hypothesis substantiates and some 
studies find a significant larger contribution from ICT investments, when they are combined with new 
organizational practices (see Brynjolfsson & Milgrom, 2013 for a comprehensive review). 
                                                 
1 For an overview of this literature see Biagi (2013), Draca et al. (2006) or Van Reenen et al. (2010). 
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In the recent past, the discussion around ICT use and its effects for organizational performance has 
progressed quite a bit. In the Information System literature, for example, Nevo and Wade (2010) have 
developed a theory that holds that information technology assets can become sources of competitive 
advantage if they are combined with proper organizational resources. However, identifying 
complementarities is a complex issue as combining organizational and technological capital not always 
stimulates economic outcome. For example, both centralized and decentralized decision rights can be 
valuable if they are supported with the right technology (Tiwana 2015). But what is the right 
technology? The relevant question to be answered is therefore which combinations of organizational and 
technological capital lead to synergies. 
Previous studies on the complementary relationship between technological and organizational capital 
mostly use composite measures of both technological capital and organizational capital (e.g., 
Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Bresnahan et al., 2002). Hence, they do not distinguish between different types 
of technological and organizational capital. Another strand of the literature focuses on very specific 
types of technological or organizational capital (e.g., Chwelos et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2015), which also 
makes it difficult to get an overall picture of where synergies exist and where not. By distinguishing 
among two different technology types (information technology (IT) and communication technology 
(CT)) and three different forms of organizational capital (employee voice, work design and workforce 
training), the goal of this study is to adopt a more nuanced analysis by examining complementarities 
among different components of technological and organizational capital (see Figure 1). Concretely, we 
thus test whether IT and CT, respectively, stimulate or hamper the effect of employee voice, work 
design, and workforce training. We thereby aim to better understand what role different technologies 
play for optimal organizational designs and aim to shed more light on how businesses may direct their 
technology investments most productively. Probably most related to this study, Bloom et al. (2014) find 
that IT is related to a higher degree of decision autonomy and a greater span of control, whereas CT 
decreases autonomy. However, it remains unclear whether IT also stimulates other components of 
Technological and Organizational Capital 
 
3 
organizational capital, and whether CT generally hampers the effect of organizational capital. In this 
paper, we predict that this is not the case. 
Our analyses are based on data from four waves of the KOF Innovation Survey covering a 
representative sample of Swiss firms in the years 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. We adopt a performance 
differences approach (Brynjolfsson and Milgrom, 2013) and examine the impacts of adopting different 
types of ICT and organization on productivity outcomes in productivity regressions. As these surveys 
include information on firm productivity, many different components of workplace organization, ICT 
use, as well as other potential drivers of firm productivity, an important advantage of this data is that 
complementarities between ICT and organizational capital can be analyzed in greater detail than 
previous studies were able to. Furthermore, as the data spans a period of almost ten years, we have 
enough within-firm variation in order to control for unobserved time invariant firm fixed effects, which 
allows us to significantly reduce a potential omitted variable bias problem. 
In line with our expectations, we find that IT and CT exert distinct — and often opposed — forces on 
the optimal degree of employee voice, work design and workforce training. Moreover, as the moderating 
effects of IT and CT with organizational capital countervail each other, we observe rather weak 
complementarities between organizational capital and ICT in general. In sum, the results thus clearly 
confirm our prediction that a disaggregated analysis is required in order to properly identify 
complementarities between technological and organizational capital.  
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Beyond the traditional forms of capital, such as labor and physical capital, economists increasingly 
acknowledge the importance of new types of production factors: In particular, the emergence and rise of 
vast investments into ICT has led an asset coined ‘technological capital’ or ‘ICT capital’ to distinguish 
these productive investments from more traditional ones in non-ICT capital (Arvanitis & Loukis, 2009). 
Moreover, there is a general tendency in shifting from old, Tayloristic to modern, holistic organizations, 
which are reliant on new work practices such as continuous learning, increased worker autonomy and 
higher decentralization (Lindbeck & Snower, 2000). The case study literature points to leading examples 
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from different industries such as Lincoln Electric, Walmart, Dell or Google (see Brynjolfsson & 
Saunders, 2010). These firms have all heavily and deliberately invested in these new organizational 
practices and developed and accumulated an asset frequently termed ‘organizational capital’. The 
conceptual framework put forth in the following takes a careful look at the component parts of these 
new types of capital and examines their synergetic interactions. 
2.1 Components of technological and organizational capital 
Technological capital 
An overwhelming body of researchers treated ICT as a single, aggregated technological capital stock 
when examining their economic impacts. However, such a non-differentiated, aggregated ICT-
perspective can be disputed, and IT and CT should be analysed separately (Bloom et al., 2014; Garicano, 
2000). We propose to maintain this crucial distinction between IT and CT when examining 
complementary organizational interactions. We distinguish the two along their functional rather than 
their formal dimension because it matters to workers what they can do with these technologies, and less 
so how the technologies are formally set up (Schienstock et al., 2002). Moreover, focusing on their 
functional rather than formal nature appears to be more sensible because their technical characteristics 
and capabilities usually change rapidly whereas their functional objectives and use cases do less so. 
Hence, we understand IT as the computer hardware and software which is primarily used as an 
information processing device to (i) collect and, analyze information, (ii) automate and improve work 
processes or (iii) to monitor and control work behavior or production processes (cf. Schienstock et al., 
2002; Huang et al. 2012). While many information-processing activities can be directly performed on 
local information systems, CTs instead always rely on a network infrastructure and connectivity that 
links different information systems together to become productive. They are primarily used as 
information flow and knowledge exchange devices to (i) distribute, transmit and communicate 
information or (ii) to coordinate temporally and spatially distributed activities (cf. Schienstock et al., 
2002; Huang et al. 2012). Beyond other telecommunication technologies (such as telephone, fax, mail, 
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internet, video conferencing or electronic data interchange), the introduction of corporate intranets was, 
for instance, a notable technological innovation affecting the communication, sharing and distribution of 
documentation within firms. 
 
Organizational capital 
The conceptualization of organizational capital is a burgeoning research area in economics and there has 
not yet emerged a general consensus on its definition, but it is probably best understood as the value of 
intangible and non-tradable stock of organizational practices, processes and structures both within and 
between firms (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2010). The literature praised not more than a handful of 
attempts that approach the notion of organizational capital systematically and we draw on a 
comprehensive taxonomy provided by Black and Lynch (2005). They proposed to comprise 
organizational capital within any organization into three different categories: employee voice, work 
design and workforce training, each of which was shown to be productivity enhancing both theoretically 
and empirically. Black and Lynch (2005) argue that these three components of organizational capital are 
a comprehensive but not an exhaustive list of all possible elements. The role of further components of 
organizational capital, such as e.g. firm structure or incentive pay schemes will be discussed in an 
extension to the main model (see Section 5.2). 
The first element ‘employee voice’ includes organizational structures that provide workers, 
especially lower level production workers, with more decision power to contribute towards the design 
production processes and a higher degree of autonomy to structure their own work. Examples range 
from individual or collective employee consultation, to decentralized decision competencies and self-
managed teams to individual job-enrichment schemes (ibid., p. 207). Second, ‘work design’ embraces 
the creation and development of organizational practices and processes that enable a more flexible 
reallocation of labor within the firm. Examples include efforts to change the firm’s occupational 
structures, adapting the number of hierarchies, investing into diverse and cross-functional teams or 
expanding job rotation and job sharing agreements (ibid., p. 207 f.). Finally, the third component of 
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organizational capital is ‘workforce training’. The human capital literature usually distinguishes training 
from education. While education obtained at academic institutions is most often of purely general 
human capital and equally valuable to all potential employers, training instead is most often firm-
specific and thus most valuable to the current employer (Lazear & Gibbs, 2008). As a consequence, the 
worker and the firm jointly determine the investment in additional skills, which are particularly valuable 
within the context of the organization. Hence, while both education and training contribute to firm 
productivity, workforce training constitutes an important component that contributes toward 
organizational capital (Black & Lynch, 2005, p. 206 f.). 
2.2 Complementarity hypotheses between individual components of technological and 
organizational capital 
The literature on complementarities between technological and organizational capital goes back to work 
of Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995), which pointed to the complex and beneficial interplay of 
technology and organizational practices to yield synergetic benefits over and above the effects that each 
element could generate on its own. Simply put, a certain degree of fit or match among the organizational 
practices and technologies in place is required to achieve superior performance (Zand et al., 2011).  
Among those studies that investigated the complementarity between technological capital and 
organizational capital on firm productivity, two different kinds of perspectives were adopted (see Figure 
1): Most often, these complementarities were examined from an aggregate perspective by using broad 
conceptual measures and composite indicators for both technological and organizational capital. A fewer 
set of studies adopted a differentiated perspective but focused on complementarities of single 
components of technological and organizational capital in isolation (e.g., only between training and 
ICT). This, however, leaves the complementary nature of technological and organizational capital 
incompletely understood.  
The goal of this research is to adopt a differentiated, disaggregated perspective to pursue a more 
nuanced analysis by examining complementarities among the previously discussed individual 
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components of technological and organizational capital. By distinguishing among two different 
technology types (IT and CT) and three different forms of organizational capital (employee voice (EV), 
work design (WD) and workforce training (WT)), there is a large number of potential complementarities 
to investigate: not only between the two types of capital considered but also among the different 
components within each type (see Figure 1). While we do not neglect the potential importance of within-
factor complementarities, our analyses suggest that they are of second order importance, as e.g. the 
different components of organizational capital appear to be largely orthogonal to one another (see Table 
A.9). Hence, we focus on between-factor complementarities and draw on most recent theoretical 
contributions to substantiate our hypotheses. 
 
Complementarities with employee voice 
Employee voice measures the degree of employee involvement and real decision power to the 
production process and may therefore be considered as an organizational asset measuring the degree of 
decentralized decision making authority.  
The literature put forth a comprehensive amount of research on the complementarity between 
technology and the allocation of decision rights (see Hitt & Brynjolfsson (1997), Caroli & Van Reenen 
(2001); Bresnahan et al. (2002); Bloom, Sadun, Van Reenen (2012)). The role that digital technologies 
play for decision authority, however, is still heavily disputed: While some argued that technology should 
be associated with more centralization, others gave reasons for more decentralization, still others 
asserted even no association at all.2 
                                                 
2 One stream of the literature argues that investments in ICT should increase tendencies towards decentralization if 
knowledge is local and resides at the periphery of the firm (Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1997; Malone, 1997; McElheran, 2014), if 
adaption to local conditions is more important than coordination (McElheran, 2014), when managers are boundedly rational 
and have a limited information processing capacity to deal with ICT-led information overflows (Bolton & Dewatripont, 1994; 
Van Zandt 1999) or, as agency theorists emphasize, when better monitoring abilities and performance measures are available 
(Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991; Malone, 1997). On the other hand, ICTs may also increase centralization if coordination of 
technology investments is more important than adaption (McElheran, 2014), and if, to mention agency-based concerns, ICT 
reduces the local information advantages of workers due to the availability of more, faster and better information to 
management (Whisler & Levitt, 1958; Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991). Yet other contributions asserted even no association at all 
(cf. Malone, 1997). 
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Bloom et al. (2014) have most recently argued that lumping together different kinds of technologies 
may fall short of the mark. Instead, a more careful analysis of differential types of technology is required 
to disentangle the effects of technology on decision authority and thereby proposed a possible solution 
to some long-standing debates in the literature. In particular, they have shown both theoretically in a 
team-theoretic framework and empirically across a number of industries and countries that the effects of 
IT and CT on a firm’s (de-)centralization decision (and thus on productivity and inequality, see Garicano 
& Rossi-Hansberg, 2015) may differ greatly. They resort to theories of the organization of knowledge 
within firms by Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) to make the key distinction 
between IT and CT on theoretical grounds. As they argue, production requires problem solving and 
decision making with the relevant knowledge for these decisions, which can either be obtained through 
the acquisition or the communication of information. This implies that firms determining the 
hierarchical level at which the organization’s decisions should be taken, ultimately face a trade-off 
between information acquisition and communication costs.3 Advanced ITs (such as Enterprise-
Resource-Planning, CAD or CAM systems) allow for a cheaper access to more and better information 
and make it more efficient to acquire the relevant knowledge, which in turn allows workers to take more 
decisions without any direct consultation of their managers. As a result, ITs push decisions ‘down’ and 
favor a more decentralized decision regime. By contrast, decreased communication costs due to better 
CTs make asking cheaper than learning and, in consequence, make consultation of their superiors more 
efficient for workers than acquiring the necessary knowledge themselves. As a result, better CTs favor 
more centralized decision-making and push decisions ‘up’ (Bloom et al., 2014).4 
                                                 
3 Garicano (2000) argues that expertise is organized hierarchically if problems are complex. He shows that knowledge-based 
hierarchies are the most efficient organizational outcome when the matching of problems to people with the necessary 
knowledge (of how to solve them) is hard, such as e.g. in situations where knowledge is completely tacit. In this case, 
specialists with non-overlapping knowledge cannot communicate and would incur too high search costs to find the relevant 
knowledge. Asking for help can only take the form of vertical communication: people with overlapping and superior 
knowledge can identify the solution (see also Garicano & Wu, 2012, Section 4.2 for an elaborate discussion). 
4 To examine the possibility of alternative theoretical explanations, they also tested the technologies’ impacts on coordination 
costs in the absence of incentive conflicts, their impacts on delegation through reduction of information asymmetries as well 
as the impact of automation and showed that none of these explanations is driving their results. 
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For these reasons, we consider advanced ITs and employee voice to interact in a complementary 
and mutually reinforcing way and expect a positive interactive productivity impact. By contrast, 
advances in CTs are expected to unleash tendencies towards centralization where the worker’s 
knowledge and decisions are substituted by their managers. Hence, CTs are expected to interfere with 
higher degrees of employee voice and should therefore feature a negative interactive effect upon 
productivity. 
 
Complementarities with work design 
Inspired by Atkinson (1984)’s core-periphery model, the literature distinguishes between two different 
types of labor flexibility, numerical (external) and functional (internal) flexibility. The former refers to 
strategies to flexibly adjust the quantity of workers via temporaries, independent contractors or 
subcontractors. The latter is characterized by a low division of work and refers to practices that broaden 
workers’ competences by means of less specialized job-assignments and increased job rotation, 
teamwork, multi-skilling or multi-tasking to enable a more flexible (re-)allocation of labor within the 
firm (see e.g. Arvanitis, 2005; Martinez-Sanchez et al., 2011; Voudouris, 2007). Work design, as the 
term is understood here, refers to the concept of functional flexibility.5  
While empirical studies generally find support for the complementarity hypotheses between 
technology and functional flexibility (see e.g. Osterman, 1994 and Black & Lynch 2004 for the United 
States; Caroli & Van Reenen, 2001, for France and Britain; Bertschek & Kaiser, 2005 for Germany; 
Arvanitis, 2005, for Switzerland; Voudouris, 2007, for Greece; Martinez-Sanchez et al., 2011, for 
Spain), the theoretical literature has not yet reached widespread agreement about the impacts of 
technological advances (see e.g. Becker & Murphy, 1992; Bolton & Dewatripont, 1994; Lindbeck & 
Snower, 2000; Dessein & Santos, 2006). In fact, there are only relatively few models that are able to 
                                                 
5 While employee voice refers to vertical allocation of decision authority, work design can be understood as the horizontal 
allocation of decision authority over various tasks (cf. Bolton & Dewatripont, 2013) 
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explain the rise of flexible work designs in light of better information and communication technologies 
(Autor, 2012; Snower & Görlich, 2013). 
An interesting starting point to examine the differential impacts of IT and CT on work design is 
provided in a renowned theoretical framework by Lindbeck and Snower (2000) who explained how 
technological advances, among other forces, shift organizations towards more flexible work designs. 
Boucekkine and Crifo (2008) have more recently advanced their static framework into a dynamic model 
with an endogenous human capital formation and were able to replicate some of the stylized facts on 
both work organization and job contents as observed in many OECD countries, including work by 
Autor, Levy and Murnane, (2002, 2003) and further empirical studies cited above.  
Building upon these contributions, it proves helpful to distinguish between the two ends of a 
continuum of flexibility degrees à la Lindbeck and Snower (2000): An organization with a low level of 
functional flexibility relies on task specialization and intra-task learning (the skill acquisition on one 
particular task over time) and reaps the returns from specialization due to scale economies. In contrast, 
high degrees of functional flexibility emphasize task complementarities and inter-task learning (the 
acquisition of skills on one tasks and their reemployment on other tasks) to earn the returns from 
multitasking due to scope economies.  
Accordingly, a firm determining the degree of functional flexibility faces a trade-off between 
returns from (task-)specialization and multitasking. Boucekkine and Crifo (2008) have shown that the 
relative size of these returns determines one of two globally stable steady-state equilibrium regimes of 
work design: A Tayloristic regime (emphasizing specialization) and a holistic regime (emphasizing 
multitasking). We argue, much in line with Boucekkine and Crifo (2008), that IT and CT exert distinct 
forces on the returns from specialization versus multitasking and therefore on the optimal degree of 
functional flexibility.6 
                                                 
6 Boucekkine and Crifo (2008) argue in more general terms about ICT and do not explicitly distinguish between IT and CT 
but they implicitly highlight the functional roles of IT and CT as defined in this article. 
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Technological advances over the past decades were hallmarked by computer-mediated mass-
production, programmable machines and automated sensory tools. These advances in IT have 
accentuated the returns from specialization by improving production speed, accuracy and scalability and 
provided employees with faster access to more and better information, which increased the overall 
productivity in performing a particular task. Bartel, Ichniowsky and Shaw  (2007) show how IT-
enhanced machinery translates into reduced production times and improved efficiency in all stages of 
production processes. Further prominent examples include the automotive industry with its standardized 
assembly lines for mass production as popularized by Henry Ford, which enabled car manufacturers to 
reap increased returns from task specialization and resulted in a widespread increase in the division of 
labor (cf. Boucekkine & Crifo, 2008; Lindbeck & Snower, 2000, provide similar examples). These 
exemplary shifts in the division of labor are not peculiar to car manufacturers; rather all mass producers 
of consumer goods worldwide adopted some of Ford’s basic principles (Dankbaar, 1997). Similarly, 
Autor et al. (2002) provide evidence for the service sector, where the introduction of information 
processing technologies in banking, such as digital imaging of bank checks and optical character 
recognition software, has led to more specialized jobs and an increase in average labor productivity in 
one of the two departments examined. 
In sum, advances in IT are thus expected to increase returns from specialization, which – according 
to the Boucekkine-Crifo model – induces profit-maximizing firms to transition towards a Tayloristic 
regime with a higher division of labor. Consequently, by increasing the returns from specialization, 
improvements in IT make work designs with lower rather than higher degrees of functional flexibility 
more efficient. In other words, IT and flexible work designs are not complements but substitutes and we 
therefore expect a negative interaction effect upon productivity.  
In contrast, advances in CT are expected to reduce the returns from specialization and increase the 
returns from multitasking. Lindbeck and Snower (2000) divide the returns from multitasking into two 
types of task complementarities: technological and informational task complementarities. Technological 
task complementarities refer to complementarities that arise from the interaction between different types 
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of labor inputs (i.e. teamwork). Informational task complementarities refer to complementarities within a 
given type of labor that arise when the knowledge and information acquired at one task may be used to 
improve the performance at another task (i.e., job rotation). Advances in modern communication and 
network technologies accentuated the returns from multitasking by increasing the returns of both types 
of task complementarities: On the one hand, they promoted technological task complementarities arising 
in e.g. teamwork by releasing any spatial or temporal barriers to human interaction and better means to 
group coordination and communication. On the other hand, they increased informational task 
complementarities that arise through e.g. flexible job-arrangements by providing employees with an 
efficient access to and an exchange of information through a corporate-wide reach of knowledge and 
knowledgeable people and permit faster and better decision-making (see Lindbeck & Snower, 2000; 
Schienstock et al., 2002).  
Advances in CT are thus expected to increase returns from multitasking, which – according to the 
Boucekkine-Crifo model – induces profit-maximizing firms to transition towards a holistic regime with 
a lower division of labor and broader task assignments.7 As a consequence, by increasing the returns 
from multitasking, advances in CT makes flexible work designs more efficient and we therefore expect 
their interaction to yield complementary productivity effects. These observations are also consistent with 
the results obtained in Dessein and Santos (2006).  
 
Complementarities with workforce training 
The literature on workforce training distinguishes between two discrete ends of a continuum of 
personnel knowledge formations (cf. Schienstock et al., 2002; Ernst & Lundvall, 2004; Peansupap & 
Walker, 2005): Formal (off-the-job) training are learning activities with a pre- determined content and 
format and are usually delivered in the traditional class room model. This type of training is particularly 
suited to transfer explicit and well-codified knowledge (‘hard’ and technical skills). By contrast, 
                                                 
7 In the Boucekkine-Crifo model, for simplicity only informational task complementarities are active because they were 
sufficient to make the argument. 
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informal (on-the-job) training is much less structured and usually occurs directly on the job through 
learning-by-doing, learning-by-using and learning-by-interacting with technical, social and 
organizational norms. Informal training thereby emphasizes and promotes the acquisition of tacit 
knowledge, the type of knowledge, which is hard to communicate but best, acquired through practice 
and experience (‘soft’ and social skills). Here, workforce training refers to the intensity of formal 
training, defined as the fraction of the total workforce participating in formal training activities. 
In today’s rapidly changing environments previously acquired skills may turn insufficient or 
obsolete and therefore call for a speeded up process of learning and a continuous adjustment of skills in 
order to keep up with the frequent changes (OECD, 2002; Ernst & Lundvall, 2004; Martinez-Sanchez et 
al., 2011).  Skill upgrading is not only sufficient; it is also necessary for a successful implementation of 
technological and organizational innovations because these changes largely depend on individuals’ 
ability to absorb the change, which is typically positively associated with higher levels of human capital 
and well-functioning training systems (Arnal et al., 2003). Advances in IT and CT are therefore both 
held to be complementary with training; each, however, may interact distinctively with training.  
First, formal learning can either take place in the form of guided learning from domain experts and 
superiors or in a non-guided form via self-learning (Peansupap & Walker, 2005). Along the lines of 
Garicano (2000)’s framework, better ITs enable cheaper information acquisition and thus promote self-
learning. Advances in CTs, instead, decrease communication cost, make supervisor consultation more 
efficient and therefore promotes the guided form of training: ‘learning from experts’. In terms of 
learning performance, these two approaches may however differ. Indeed, the literature on cognitive 
performance and instructional research for formal training is decisive and finds significant differences 
between these two forms of learning. Kirschner et al. (2006) posit that “evidence from empirical studies 
over the past half-century […] consistently indicate that minimally guided instruction is less effective 
and less efficient than instructional approaches that place a strong emphasis on guidance of the […] 
learning process.” (p. 75). Hence, we consider the guided form of learning, as promoted by CTs, to be 
superior in terms of performance than a minimally guided form of learning, which is promoted by IT. 
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Second, in line with the Boucekkine-Crifo model, a higher division of labor tends to result in 
simpler jobs and tasks that require a less diverse set of skills and hence require less intensive training 
(Schienstock et al., 2002). Multi-tasking practices, instead, generally demand a more diverse set of skills 
and a higher level of human capital, which can be acquired through a sufficient amount of training 
(Martinez-Sanchez et al., 2011). According to our previous discussion, we expect that CT promotes 
multitasking more strongly than IT does. Hence, CT should affects the need for training more 
intensively than IT does. 
Finally, a similar perspective is supported from a system complexity point of view. By combining 
and connecting stand-alone IT applications through network technologies, the system’s complexity 
degree and information content scales disproportionally. In other words, we consider combinatorial 
network technologies as main drivers behind a system’s complexity and if human-mediated interactions 
with interconnected systems require an understanding of the whole system, we consider training as 
particularly important in the presence of communication and network technologies. 
These arguments lead us to expect that while both IT and CT are complementary with training, the 
interaction between IT and training is smaller than the interaction between CT and training. 
Table 1 summarizes the direction and relative size of all effects that we predict concerning the 
impact of the combined use of distinct ITs and CTs as well as different types of organizational capital on 
firm productivity. As the interactions of employee voice and work design with IT and CT are expected 
to be of opposing signs it follows that the positive effects are larger than the negative effects. The 
following sections investigate these predictions empirically. 
3 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
Our empirical analysis is based on representative data from the KOF Innovation Survey, which is similar 
in content and structure to the well-established Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in other European 
countries. The KOF Innovation Survey, available online in all Swiss national languages (French, Italian 
and German) at www.kof.ethz.ch/en/surveys/structural-surveys/innovation-survey, contains questions 
about innovation activities and their intra-firm diffusion, and also collected information on financial 
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variables as well as basic structural characteristics of the firms. Unlike the CIS surveys, the KOF 
Innovation Survey contains an extensive section on the use of ICT technologies (internet, intranet, 
extranet, etc.), and the use of new organizational practices (job rotation, teamwork, employees’ 
involvement in decision-making, etc.). The surveys are sent to the executive board of the companies in 
paper form. Given the broad set of questions, the paper-based form of the survey allows them to hand 
out individual survey parts to the respective field experts, which further increases the probability of 
accurate responses. 
We make use of four waves of the survey conducted in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011, respectively. 
All four surveys are based on a representative sample covering Switzerland’s manufacturing, 
construction industry and business services and employ a stratification by 29 industries and 3 industry-
specific firm size classes that fully cover large firms. The raw data contains information for 2583, 2555, 
2172 and 2363 firms, which represents an average response rate of 37 percent. This response rate is 
satisfactory given the very demanding questionnaire. In all four surveys, selective phone-calls were 
made among those companies that were underrepresented in the initial round of data collection so as to 
ensure that the final structure of the dataset is similar to the underlying sample in terms of industry 
affiliation and firm size. Accordingly, the characteristics of the responding firms should be relatively 
representative for the whole industry structure. Despite these efforts in increasing representativeness of 
the sample, a certain selection bias in our regressions due to unit or item non-response to the survey 
cannot be ruled out, as non-response may be systematically related to certain variables of interest (e.g., 
the use of ICT). We thus need to be careful in generalizing the estimation results to the universe of 
Swiss firms. Moreover, as there is a relatively large time lag of three years between the surveys, only 
about half of the firms replied to two consecutive surveys, causing our panel to be (highly) unbalanced. 
By pooling the dataset we have a total of 7090 observations. The final sample used for model 
estimation was considerably smaller (about 4000 observations) primarily because the survey’s question 
on organizational practices were only answered by firms with at least 20 employees. When controlling 
for firm fixed effects, the number of firms further decreases to 2700 observations (“N”) and about 1200 
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firms (“Groups”) due to the unbalanced nature of the sample; 50% of them answered two surveys, 40% 
three surveys, and 10% answered all four surveys. On average, the firms in our sample have 412 
employees (median: 110 employees), whereupon 45% have less than 100 employees. 55% of the firms 
belong to the manufacturing sector, 36% to the service sector and 9% to the construction sector. 
To measure ICT we use the employment shares that regularly use computerized devices such as 
personal computers, workstations, terminals or laptops (computer_user_share) and data intranets 
(intranet_user_share), respectively. In line with most previous studies in this area (see Draca et al., 
2006), our measures thus refer to the use of ICT tools rather than stocks of ICT capital. Besides 
information on ICT usage, the KOF Innovation Survey also includes information on the firms’ ICT 
investment. But since we have this information only for the years in which the data were collected, we 
cannot build any proper measures of ICT capital stock.  
As discussed previously, the study aims to separate the complementarity effects of different 
components of a firm’s organizational and technological capital. Concerning our technological capital 
measures we distinguish between IT and CT. A key technological innovation affecting communication 
is the growth of intranets (see Bloom et al. 2014), which should also be a valid proxy for CT in our 
observation period of 2002-2011. Previously, such document transmissions from plants to headquarters 
took place via postal mail or fax, which caused high communication costs and prohibited smooth 
information flows and fast decision-making. The installation of corporate intranets, instead, integrated 
an organization’s information systems into a single system and enabled employees to find, share and 
communicate any information needed for their work (Boersma & Kingma, 2006).  
To proxy IT, the literature often refers to the use of technologies for Enterprise-Resource-Planning 
(ERP), Customer-Relationship-Management (CRM) and Supply-Chain-Management (SCM) (see 
Banker et al., 2006; Heim & Peng, 2010; Hendricks et al., 2007). Although the survey includes 
information on the use of these technologies, we only have information on whether the firms use these 
technologies or not, but we do not know how intensively they are used. Hence, within-firm variation is 
limited, which makes it difficult to identify potential complementarities with these measures in our 
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setting that controls for firm fixed effects. As a first step, we will thus separate the effect of IT and CT 
econometrically (see Section 4.3). In a second step, results based on direct measures of IT usage are 
presented in the robustness section. 
Concerning organizational capital we distinguish between the three components employee voice, 
work design and workforce training (other components of organizational capital are discussed in an 
extension to the main model). The data includes detailed information on the firms’ workforce 
organization that allows us to construct adequate measures for all three components of organizational 
capital. Our measure of employee voice primarily refers to autonomy and is based on seven items that 
measure the extent of competencies with respect to work speed, task sequence, task assignment, task 
execution, production problems, client contact, and client complains. Work design is proxied by two 
items that measure the extent of team work and job rotation, respectively. To directly test our 
predictions, we combine the information on the six and two items referring to employee voice and 
workforce training, respectively, in two overall measures. In order to deal with potential differences in 
the relevance of the different items, we combine them by taking the mean of the standardized values (see 
Bresnahan et al., 2002 for a related procedure). The composition of the different items is largely 
confirmed by factor analysis (see Table A.9).8 Nevertheless, to identify potential differences among the 
different items, all items are also tested separately in the robustness section (see Table A.6). Finally, the 
share of employees taking part in continued training is used as measure for workforce training. In 
addition to information on these three elements of organization capital, the dataset also contains 
information on firm structure or incentive pay schemes. In order to get a complete picture of the effect 
of organization capital, the effect of these elements is also tested as an extension to the main model (see 
Section 5.2). For a more detailed description of these variables and all other model variables see Table 2. 
                                                 
8 Moreover, the factor analysis indicates that the measures of delayering and incentive pay, in fact should be considered 
separately. The respective results are thus discussed in an extension to the main model (see Section 5.2). 
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4 ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Model specification  
As Hempell (2006) pointed out, the idea of complementarities or synergies was theoretically formalized 
based on the fairly general mathematical model of supermodularity. The theory has two implications as 
of how complementarities can be tested on empirical grounds: Either via examining correlations of 
factor demands or by testing the effect of combinations of ICT usage and organizational practices on 
firm productivity (see Brynjolfsson & Milgrom, 2013). A drawback of examining correlations is that 
even if correlations between practices are well-measured, decision makers may not have sufficient 
information to choose efficiency or output enhancing combinations of practices. Moreover, unobserved 
heterogeneity between different practices makes it difficult to correctly identify potential 
complementarities based on the study of correlations (see Athey and Stern 1998). The latter approach 
does not have these drawbacks and can serve as a direct test for complementarity or substitutability (see 
Carree et al. 2011). Similar to prior studies such as Aral and Weill (2007), we thus adopt the latter, more 
direct approach and estimate the following relation: 
 
log (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � + 𝛽𝛽4𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable given as the value added per employee of firm 𝑖𝑖, which operates in 
industry 𝑗𝑗, at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the stacked (column-)vectors of technological and 
organizational variables, respectively, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes controls and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the stochastic error. In order to 
absorb any firm-specific shocks and industry-specific shocks over time, we include further controls for 
firm fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ) and industry-specific time fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ). 
To reduce a potential omitted variable bias further, we include measures for the firms’ technological 
and organizational capital in the baseline model. More specifically, following canonical specifications of 
simple production functions (see, e.g., Griliches and Mairesse 1998), the estimates include measures of 
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production inputs both the quantity and quality of labor inputs (employment_number, tertiary_share), 
capital inputs (non_ICT_investment)9 and R&D expenditures (r&d_expenditures). Moreover, we control 
for whether the company is foreign-owned (foreign_owned), the intensity of price (price_competition) 
and non-price competition (non_price_competition).  
In an extended version of the baseline model we additionally include controls for whether the firm 
has experienced company restructuring in the form of spinoffs (sale_of_division), outsourcing 
(outsourcing), takeovers (takeover) or merging (merger), which may directly affect the performance of 
the firms. To deal with autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, we present standard errors that are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm-level (clustered sandwich estimator). In order to deal with 
skewed data quantitative measures such as value added per employee or the number of employees are in 
logs (see Table 2 and Table A.1 for an exact definition of the model variables and descriptive statistics, 
respectively). 
4.2 Testing for complementarities 
As indicated above, we identify potential complementarities between a firm’s technological and 
organizational capital by individually interacting the ICT variables with the measures of workplace 
organization.10 Complementarities are present if the marginal productivity depends positively on the 
level of other productive factors, or in technical terms, once the cross-partial derivative is positive, 
𝜕𝜕2𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 0. To visualize the different interaction effects, we present the average marginal 
                                                 
9 As we have this information only for the years in which the survey was collected, and only very few firms answered all four 
surveys, it is not possible to construct an adequate capital stock variable. However, by matching further data, we are able to 
partially limit these concerns in a robustness specification in which we use information on the firm’s net investments in the 
previous four years (instead of just one year) prior to the survey, which improves our measurement of the firm’s true capital 
intensity. Because these data are available only for the subsample of firms that also participated in the quantitative KOF 
investment surveys, including this better proxy of the capital-output ratio leads to a substantial drop in sample size. As the 
inclusion of this variable does not affect the estimation results (results are available on request), we thus decided to control in 
our model specifications for capital input only. However, as capital intensity is to a large extent firm- and/or industry-
specific, the effect from the use of capital will to a large extend be captured by the detailed controls for industry affiliation 
and firm fixed effects.  
10 In contrast to previous studies in this field of research (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers 2006, Bertscheck and Kaiser 2005), 
we have continuous measures for both ICT usage and organizational capital. Hence, it does not make sense to construct 
exclusive combinations of the two. However, to visualize the interaction effects, we will present figures that show the 
average marginal effects of ICT usage for different levels of organizational capital (see Figure 2). 
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effects of intranet use and computer use, respectively, for different levels of organizational capital (see 
Figure 2). 
As the measures of technological and organizational capital are likely to be correlated, we obviously 
face a trade-off when simultaneously including multiple interactions in a single model. On the one hand, 
this allows us to avoid potential endogeneity concerns due to an omitted variable bias and thus to 
identify the different complementarity effects more properly. On the other hand, however, we may 
thereby introduce a multicollinearity problem, as the different variables are highly correlated.11 We will 
deal in Section 5 with this issue in two ways: First, we will assess the robustness of the results by 
comparing the estimation results that simultaneously include all interactions with those that include the 
different interaction terms separately (see Table 3 and Table A.5). This allows us to evaluate the severity 
of a potential omitted variable bias if we do not simultaneously include the different interaction terms. 
Second, we will fix the organizational variables over time by taking for each firm the mean values of the 
available observations. As the firm fixed effects will then absorb the linear terms of the organizational 
variables we do not need to include the linear terms of the organizational variables explicitly and are 
therefore able to include fewer collinear variables, which may reduce the multicollinearity problem 
while still allowing us to identify the interaction effects.12 Bloom et al. (2012), who also use fixed 
organizational variables, argue that, at least in the short term, the assumption of quasi-fixed management 
practices is plausible, because management practices are difficult to change over time at the firm level 
(see also Tambe et al., 2012 for a similar argument; for a theoretical justification of this argument see 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1990 or Bresnahan et al., 1996). In line with this prediction, we observe that most 
variation of the organizational variable is between firms rather than within firms.13 Nevertheless, we will 
                                                 
11 At least for firm level survey data the correlation between the different ICT and organizational variables is quite substantial 
(see Table A.2). 
12 Note that the interaction terms with the ICT variables are still identified, even if the fixed effects absorb the linear terms of 
the organizational variables. 
13 We observe the following standard deviations: employee_voice (overall: 0.62; between: 0.58; within: 0.31), work_design 
(overall: 0.77; between: 0.70; within: 0.40), workforce_training (overall: 1.08; between: 1.02; within: 0.52). 
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test in the robustness section whether allowing the organizational variables to vary over time affects the 
interpretation of our results (see Table A.4). 
4.3 Separating the effect of communication and information technologies 
As described before we only have information on the propensity but not on the intensity of use of IT, 
which makes it difficult to identify potential complementarities with these measures in our setting that 
controls for firm fixed effects. However, we have information on the intensity of use of computerized 
devices and data intranets, respectively. While the former is a typical measure for ICT as a whole, the 
latter measures the use of CT. Hence, the interaction between use of computerized devices and 
organizational variables will indicate whether complementarities between ICT and organizational capital 
exist in general, but it is unclear whether CT or IT drives this effect. However, when additionally 
controlling for complementarities between intranet use and organizational capital, we should capture the 
complementarity effect between CT and organizational capital, wherefore the interaction effects with 
computer use then should reflect mainly complementarities between IT and organizational capital. 
A general concern in the analysis of complementarity in organizations is that complementary 
variables tend to be adopted together – in our case computers and intranet – which makes it hard to 
distinguish the effects from computers from those of intranets (Brynjolfsson and Milgrom, 2013). Since 
we not only have information about the availability of technologies, but also know how intensively 
computers and intranets are used, correlation between the two variables will be much lower and this 
problem is significantly reduced. This is supported by our low within-firm correlation between the two 
technology variables computer_user_share and intranet_user_share, which amounts to only 0.2673. 
Hence, there appears to be sufficient independent variation in ICT and CT to separate the two effects 
(see also respective discussion in the robustness section). 
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4.4 Unobserved heterogeneity 
Although a potential omitted variable bias should be significantly reduced in our framework, because a 
broad set of observables generally affecting the firms’ productivity is included in the estimation 
equations besides ICT and organizational variables, it cannot be ruled out completely. Unfortunately, 
there is so far no “magic bullet” to deal with unobserved heterogeneity that simultaneously affects factor 
inputs and firm productivity (Bloom et al., 2012, p. 175). This is even truer as we do not focus on one 
specific complementarity but rather analyze complementarities between all different components of 
technological and organizational capital simultaneously. To date, the best practice to deal with the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity is using a “within-group” estimator. Hence, we include a full set 
of firm fixed effects in our models that control for unobserved time invariant effects. Furthermore, to 
capture industry-specific shocks over time, we control for industry-specific time fixed effects (NACE 2-
digit level).  
5 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
5.1 Main results 
The main results are presented in Table 3. We present the estimation results of our baseline productivity 
model with firm- and industry-time-fixed effects.14 In column (1) we test complementarities between 
computer use and the three different measures of organizational practices, indicating whether 
complementarities between ICT as a whole and organizational capital exists. In column (2) we 
alternatively include the interactions between intranet use and the three organizational variables that 
measure potential complementarities between CT and organizational capital. Finally, in column (3) we 
                                                 
14 Alternative estimates with time fixed effects instead of industry-time fixed effects are presented in columns (1) to (3) of 
Table A.3. There are some differences between the two models. As industry-time fixed effects are more conservative and 
thus better able to control for any unobserved heterogeneity, we will henceforth primarily focus on the estimation results 
given in column Table 3. The main conclusions, however, also hold for the other models. 
In columns (4) to (6) of Table A.3 we additionally include controls for restructuring of the companies. These controls, 
however, turn out to be statistically insignificant and their inclusion only marginally affects the other estimation results. 
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simultaneously include all six interaction terms, which should allow us to disentangle the impact of IT 
and CT (see Section 4.3).  
The results in column (1) indicate that complementarities between ICT as a whole and the three 
subcategories of organizational capital are rather moderate. When we control for industry-time fixed 
effects, no significant effects can be identified for the direct effect of ICT and its complementarities with 
employee voice, workforce training and work design, respectively (some complementarity can be 
identified for employee voice when not controlling for industry-time fixed effects; see column 1 of 
Table A.3). 
The results in column (2) point towards the existence of more complementarities between CT and 
organizational capital: significant complementarities can be observed between intranet use and work 
design and intranet use and workforce training, respectively. However, no complementarities can be 
found between intranet use and employee voice. The relevance of combined use of CT and 
organizational practices is emphasized by the fact that the direct effect of intranet use tend to be 
negative, indicating that the use of CT in absence of organizational practices affects a firm’s 
productivity negatively. 
As a firm’s use of IT and CT is expected to be correlated, the sole inclusion of CT variables 
probably measures a mixed effect. Hence, more decisive conclusions can be drawn when we 
simultaneously control for ICT and CT use, as done in column (3). This model should allow us to 
interpret the intranet variables as ‘pure’ CT effects while the variable for computer use should then 
capture the ‘pure’ effect of IT use (see Section 4.3). We will call this model our ‘main model’ from now 
on. By simultaneously including all interaction effects, we indeed observe a clearer pattern and this 
reveals several interesting results. First, in line with our predictions presented in Table 1, employee 
voice complements IT use, but has a negative interaction effect with CT use on productivity, which is 
consistent with the findings in Bloom et al. (2014). Second, with respect to work design, consistent with 
our theoretical predictions, we find negative interaction effects with IT use and positive interaction 
effects with CT use. Hence, as expected, a combined use of work design practices and CT stimulates 
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productivity, whereas the combined use of work design practices and IT hampers productivity. 
Furthermore, the direct effect of intranet use now is clearly negative, which indicates that the use of CT 
in absence of organizational practices negatively affects a firm’s productivity. Third, concerning 
workforce training we identify significant complementarities with use of CT, but no complementarities 
with IT. While we do not have any clear explanation for why the interaction effect of workforce training 
and IT turns out to be insignificant (and negative), the results indicate a larger relevance of workforce 
training for the use of CT than for the use of IT, which is again in line with our predictions.15 
In sum, the empirical findings are thus largely in line with our theoretical predictions presented in 
Table 1. As the effects of combined use of organizational practices and IT mostly show in the opposite 
direction than the effects of combined use of organizational practices and CT, it is not surprising that we 
can only identify weak complementarity effects of organizational capital and ICT in general (column 1). 
Furthermore, a comparison of the results shows that by solely including the CT variables (column 2), the 
direct effect of intranet use and the interaction effects with employee voice and workforce training are 
less significant. Hence, the interaction effects seem to capture part of the IT effect, which is not that 
surprising given that the use of IT and CT is likely to be correlated.  
In Figure 2, we visualize the different interaction effects. Based on the estimation results of column 
(3) of Table 3, we present the average marginal effects of intranet use and computer use, i.e. the 
marginal effects of IT and CT evaluated at their means, for different levels of organizational capital. A 
positive slope of these functions indicates that technological and organizational capital are 
complementary, a negative slope indicates that technological and organizational capital countervail each 
other. Moreover, the figures illustrate at which intensity of organizational capital, an increase of 
technological capital significantly affects productivity, namely where the confidence bounds fall below 
or exceed the zero line. For most interactions, we observe that the marginal effect of technological 
capital differs for low levels of organizational capital and high levels of organizational capital. Take for 
                                                 
15 The effect of combined use of IT and workforce training is larger than the effect of combined use of CT and workforce 
training (p-value for Wald test of equality of coefficients based on model 9: 0.11). 
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example the interaction between work design and intranet use in Figure 2, Panel (d). At high levels of 
work design, an increase of intranet use significantly positively affects productivity, which is in line 
with our complementarity hypotheses. However, at low levels of work design, we do not only observe 
significant lower productivity effects of intranet use, but an increase of intranet use even reduces 
productivity. This result clearly emphasizes that the use of work design and intranet must go hand in 
hand, otherwise the costs of technology use may even be larger than its benefits. As Figure 2 shows, 
very similar results do also hold for other combinations of organizational and technological capital. 
5.2 Test additional organizational measures 
In our analysis of organizational capital, we follow Black and Lynch (2005) who proposed to comprise 
organizational capital into the three components employee voice, work design and workforce training. 
However, they acknowledged that these three components are not a complete list of all possible 
elements of organizational capital. For example, span of control (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2011) and 
incentive pay (Ichniowski et al. 2000) turned out to be other important structural dimensions of 
organizational capital. The complementarity of these components is tested as an extension to the main 
model and the respective results are presented in Table 4. Delayering is used as measure of span of 
control. Although delayering and employee voice are two distinct concepts, they tend to move together 
(see Bloom & Van Reenen, 2011). Hence, we are not surprised to see that the pattern for delayering is 
related to the pattern observed for employee voice (Caroli and Van Reenen 2001), i.e. a positive 
correlation is observed with computer use and a negative correlation with intranet use. However, the 
respective standard errors turn out to be large and we cannot identify significant effects for this variable, 
which is likely due to the fact that delayering is a binary variable (measuring whether a firm decreased 
the number of layers in the five years before the survey).  
While individual pay should lead to more competition among workers and is likely to decrease their 
willingness to contribute to teamwork, group and firm payment schemes are expected to stimulate 
teamwork to achieve the group’s goals (Arvanitis et al. 2016, Ichniowski et al. 2000). As teamwork is an 
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important factor contributing to work design, we would expect the group and firm payment schemes to 
interact similarly with the different technology types as work design.  Indeed, this happens to be the 
case: Group and firm performance salary seem to be complementary with CT and show (weakly 
significant) negative interactive effects with IT. Finally, the effects for individual performance salary are 
much lower than for the two other salary measures that more directly contribute to teamwork. Overall, 
these analyses show that our main results remain robust to the inclusion of these additional dimensions 
of organizational capital and also show that they are largely in line with theoretical a priori expectations. 
5.3 Robustness tests 
In order to examine the robustness of our main results we pursued several robustness tests. All tests are 
based on our main model presented in Column (3) of Table 3 that simultaneously includes the computer 
use and intranet use variables and controls for industry-time fixed effects. 
 
Allow organizational variables to vary over time 
In order to examine the impact of quasi-fixing the organizational variables, Table A.4 presents the 
estimation results of the main model when we allow the organizational variables to vary over time. An 
inspection of the estimation results reveal that the effects of the interaction terms all point in the same 
direction as before, indicating robustness to changes over time. Furthermore, the significance of the 
effects is only marginally affected. Only the effect of the combined use of computer use and employee 
voice is somewhat smaller and therefore losing significance.  
 
Separate inclusion of interaction terms 
In order to test how multicollinearity may affect the estimation results, Table A.5 presents the results of 
the main model with individual inclusion of the different interaction terms. In general the results appear 
to be reasonably robust. All single coefficients of the interaction terms point in the same direction as 
before. As we measure a mixed effect of IT and CT without simultaneously controlling for both 
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components of ICT, it comes only at little surprise that some of the effects are somewhat smaller and 
less significant than in the main model (column 3 of Table 3). In general they differ, however, only 
marginally from the results that we obtained when either testing complementarities with ICT in general 
(column 1 of Table 3) or CT (column 2 of Table 3).  
 
Test subcategories of overall organizational variables 
To measure work design and employee voice we combined the information of multiple variables (see 
Section 3). To get an idea about whether the used weighted mean variable really makes sense, we test in 
Table A.6 whether the effects differ among the respective subcategories. In Columns (1) and (2) we 
replace the work design variable with its two subcategories. For both variables we find the expected 
positive interaction effect with intranet use and the negative interaction effect with computer use, even 
though the negative effect is not statistically significant for job rotation. 
Columns (3) to (9) present the estimation results in case we replace the employee voice variable by 
its subcategories. In general, we observe the expected pattern: a positive interaction effect between 
computer use and the different types of employee voice, and a negative interaction effect between 
intranet use and the different types of employee voice. The fact that the pattern is more pronounced for 
the three variables referring to decisions with respect to work speed, task sequences, and task execution 
was to be expected, as these variables are generally known to capture important aspects of 
decentralization (Bresnahan et al., 2002). 
In sum, we thus conclude that the observed pattern for the different subcategories is largely in line 
with the observed pattern for the overall organizational variables. Hence, the composition of the 
variables does not seem to drive the estimation results. Quite the contrary, the results show that the 
composition of different variables is important in order to properly identify the different interaction 
effects. When using the information of the different subcategories of the organizational variables 
separately, the interaction effects tend to show less explanatory power, which directly affects the 
significance and size of the direct effects of computer and intranet use, respectively.  




Test direct measures of IT usage 
As we lack information on the intensity of IT usage, we decided to identify the IT effects in a first step 
econometrically. The estimation results indicate that we are indeed able to properly identify the effects 
of differential types of technologies: First, although one may expect IT and CT to feature a strong co-
movement and consequently potentially inflated variances due to collinear technology variables, most of 
the interaction effects turn out to be statistically significant when we simultaneously incorporate the 
technology variables (ICT and CT). This indicates that there is sufficient independent variation to 
separate the effects from IT and CT despite (potential) multicollinearity concerns. Second, the direction 
of most interaction effects is in line with our expectations for the different organizational variables and 
previous findings for autonomy (see Bloom et al., 2014). Moreover, the directions of change in the 
effects when filtering out the effect of CT within the ICT variable to measure the impact of IT, is largely 
in line with a priori expectations: Due to the countervailing effect of IT and CT only moderate 
interaction effects are observed for ICT in general, but once we additionally control for interactions with 
CT, the interaction effects with ICT become statistically significant and also have the expected sign. 
To further test the robustness of our results, we present in Table A.7 estimation results that are based 
on direct measures of IT usage. Concretely, we use information on whether the firms use Enterprise-
Resource-Planning (ERP), Customer-Relationship-Management (CRM) and Supply-Chain-Management 
(SCM), which are typical ITs (Banker et al., 2006; Heim & Peng, 2010; Hendricks et al., 2007). 
However, as discussed before, all of them are binary variables that measure whether the firms use these 
technologies or not. Hence, within-firm variation is limited.16 It is thus not surprising that the standard 
errors of these variables are quite large in our setting that controls for firm fixed effects, which 
aggravates the identification of potential complementarities. Nevertheless, the direction of the effects is 
largely in line with the findings of our main model: While employee voice is positively related to IT, 
                                                 
16 We observe the following standard deviations: ERP (overall: 0.49; between: 0.46; within: 0.21), CRM (overall: 0.48; 
between: 0.44; within: 0.23), SCM (overall: 0.35; between: 0.31; within: 0.18). 
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work design shows a negative correlation. The pattern is less clear for workforce training. Depending on 
the chosen measure for IT, positive or negative interaction effects with workforce training are found.  
However, in line with our main results, all these interaction effects with workforce training are relatively 
small in size and clearly insignificant. 
 
Test differences over time 
The period considered in the main model is quite long (2002-2011). As ICT evolved quite rapidly over 
this period, the findings of our main model may be driven by a specific period in time. To further test the 
robustness of our results, we estimate our main model for alternative time windows (see Table A.8). The 
estimation results largely confirm our previous findings. Columns (1) to (3) indicate that the 
complementarity between ICT and employee voice decreases over time, while the complementarity with 
workforce training increases. The results in Column (4), however, show that these differences seem to 
be primarily driven by the shorter time period rather than potential changes in the effects over time. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
A promising avenue in the empirical and theoretical literature on digitization and firm productivity has 
put forth the complementarity hypothesis between technological and organizational capital. However, 
the literature so far, adopted primarily an aggregate perspective by using broad conceptual measures and 
composite indicators for either one or both, technological and organizational capital. We argue that such 
an aggregate and non-differentiated perspective falls short of the mark and leaves the complementary 
nature incompletely understood. This article puts forth a conceptual framework based on a 
comprehensive taxonomy of technology and organization and adopts a differentiated perspective to 
pursue a more nuanced analysis of the existent complementarities among the different components of 
technological and organizational capital (see Table 1 for a summary of predictions). This matters to 
business executives because it allows them to better understand how digital technologies are most 
effectively implemented to promote productivity (Dedrick et al., 2003) and it matters to policy makers to 
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foster policy landscapes that embrace the power of ICT and seize the digital opportunity (Brynjolfsson 
& Saunders, 2010; Crespi et al., 2007).  
Based on recent contributions in the literature, the conceptual framework employed in this article 
argues that IT and CT exert distinct and often opposed forces on the optimal degree of decision 
authority, functional flexibility and training intensity. First, we argue that the optimal degree of decision 
authority at any given level of hierarchy is driven by the trade-off between information acquisition and 
communication costs. IT should promote higher levels of decentralized decision power by lowering 
information acquisition costs and is therefore expected to interact positively with employee voice. CT, 
instead, should unleash tendencies towards centralized decision-making by decreasing communication 
costs, which interferes with higher levels of employee voice and is therefore conjectured to entail 
negative interactive productivity effects. Second, organizations may either rely on low functional 
flexibility to reap the returns from task specialization and intra-task learning due to scale economies or 
they may emphasize broad task assignments to reap the benefits from task complementarities and inter-
task learning due to scope economies. While advances in IT should increase returns to specialization, IT 
is considered to promote not more but less flexible work designs and is therefore expected to feature a 
negative interaction effect upon productivity. Improvements in CT, instead, should increase the returns 
from multitasking and interact in a mutually reinforcing way with higher degrees of functional flexibility 
giving rise to superadditive productivity effects. Third, while we expect workforce training to be 
complementary with both IT and CT, because rapid technological and organizational progress require a 
constant upgrading of skills, we expect CT to unleash stronger impacts for the need of training than IT 
because – to name one reason among others – networking technologies are the main driver for system 
complexity.  
We confirm most of these predictions using a comprehensive panel dataset from four consecutive 
waves of the KOF Innovation Survey, which is similar in content and structure to the well-established 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in many European countries, and covers a representative sample of 
the Swiss firms over the post millennium years (from 2002 to 2011). In terms of identification, we 
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employ a ‘best-practice’ within-group estimation and include both a full set of firm fixed effects to 
control for unobserved time invariant effects and industry-specific time fixed effects to capture any 
industry-specific shocks. Moreover, our results appear to be robust with respect to the assumption of 
time-invariant organizational variables, separate inclusion of interaction terms and the construction of 
our organizational variables. 
The study thereby confirms that the distinction between IT and CT is important, which has 
implications for research. Although some evidence of complementarity between ICT and organizational 
capital has been found in previous studies (see Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Crespi 
et al., 2007), our results indicate that the effects for most components of organizational capital go in 
opposite directions. Hence, the effect of ICT seems to decrease when mixing up information and 
communication technologies, and may – as in our case – even become insignificant. This may partly 
explain the inability of quite many studies to assess any notable complementarities between 
technological and organizational capital based on overall ICT measures (see Bertscheck & Kaiser, 2001; 
Caroli & Van Reenen, 2001; Black & Lynch, 2004; Arvanitis & Loukis, 2009). Moreover, the results 
indicate that evidence by Bloom et al. (2014) for authority and a wider span of control cannot be 
extended to organizational capital in general, and thereby confirms our predictions that the distinction 
between different components of organizational capital is important to properly identify 
complementarity effects with ICT. 
With regards to management implications, our results clearly indicate that firms have to harmonize 
their ICT infrastructure and organizational practices. They suggest on the one hand that firms who wish 
to efficiently endow their workers with a higher degree of employee voice should prioritize their 
infrastructure investments in IT over those in CT. On the other hand, firms who aim to fully embrace 
flexible work designs and intensive workforce training, instead, should primarily fuel investments in CT 
rather than IT. Moreover, as the effects of different components of organizational capital go in opposite 
directions, the results also indicate that extensive use of multiple components of organizational and 
technological capital may not maximize firm productivity. 
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There are several directions from this line of research: First, from a theoretical point of view, the 
true wait is for a theory that is able to explain these empirical phenomena within a unified theoretical 
framework. Second, more often than not, firms rather employ hybrid than single forms of the 
organizational modes considered, e.g. a mixture of low and high functional flexibility or a combination 
decentralization and centralization among different establishments, hierarchical levels or skill groups. 
As we expect the results to be even more clear-cut at more granular levels, it may be empirically 
sensible to examine the proposed framework at an establishment or even worker level. Moreover, 
studies based on qualitative and case-based analyses à la Bartel, Ichniowsky, Shaw and co-authors 
provide a close and careful look at the key mechanisms and are expected to reveal important insights 
(see Ichniowsky and Shaw (2013) for a review). Third, it will be interesting to see whether our findings 
also hold for new types of communication and information technologies. If we may cast a glance into 
the future about on-going technological developments, the analysis put forth in this article suggests that 
managers who aim to increasingly employ innovations in the realm of information technologies, most 
notably artificial intelligence and machine learning, may avail themselves of the complementary nature 
with organizational practices by empowering employees with more decision authority because these 
innovations will most likely significantly reduce the costs associated with the acquisition and the 
processing of information. Moreover, to the extent that we may understand the recent surge of the 
Internet of Things as advances in communication and network technologies, our framework suggest that 
organizations who wish to make intensive use thereof should enable functionally flexible work 
organizations and foster their workforce training programs to reap the complementary productivity 
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Table 2: Variable definition and measurement 
Dependent variables   
value_added_per_employee Value added per employee, logarithm 
Independent variables  
computer_user_share 
Employment share that regularly uses computerized devices 
(transformation of 6-level ordinal variable (level 1: '0%'; level 2: '1-20%'; level 3: '21-40%'; level 4: '41-60%';  
level 5: '61-80%'; level 6: '81-100%') to point measures by taking the average between the two ends of  
the respective intervals) 
intranet_user_share 
Employment share that regularly uses data intranets 
(transformation of 6-level ordinal variable (level 1: '0%'; level 2: '1-20%'; level 3: '21-40%'; level 4: '41-60%';  
level 5: '61-80%'; level 6: '81-100%') to point measures by taking the average between the two ends of  
the respective intervals) 
IT_intensity 
Number of different IT software used by the firm 
(the following software is considered: Enterprise-Resource-Planning (ERP), Customer-Relationship-
Management (CRM) and Supply-Chain-Management (SCM)) 
employee voice 
Extent of decentralization of competencies 
(mean of standardized values (mean 0; standard deviation 1) of seven five-level ordinal variables ranging 
from ‘line manager decides alone’ up to ‘employee decides alone’: 1) speed of work, 2) sequence of tasks, 
3) assignment of tasks, 4) modality of the execution of tasks, 5) problems in production, 6) regular contact 
with clients, 7) complaints of clients) 
workforce_training Share of employees taking part in continued training, logarithm 
work_design 
Extent of teamwork and job rotation 
(mean of standardized values of two six-level ordinal variables ranging from 'very high' (value 5) to 'does 
not exist' (value 0)) 
delayering  Decrease in the number of layers in the firm in the five years before the survey yes/no 
individual_performance_salary Extent of compensation based on individual performance  (5-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'low importance'; level 5: 'high importance')) 
group_performance_salary Extent of compensation based on workgroup performance  (5-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'low importance'; level 5: 'high importance')) 
firm_performance_salary Extent of compensation based on firm performance  (5-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'low importance'; level 5: 'high importance')) 
employment_number Number of employees (in full-time equivalents), logarithm 
tertiary_share Employment share of employees with tertiary-level education, logarithm 
r&d_expenditures R&D expenditures per employee, logarithm 
non_ICT_investment Gross investment expenditure in non-ICT capital per employee, logarithm  
foreign_owned Foreign-owned firm yes/no 
price_competition Intensity of price competition  (5-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'very weak'; level 5: 'very strong')) 
non_price_competition Intensity of non-price competition  (5-level ordinal variable (level 1: 'very weak'; level 5: 'very strong')) 
outsourcing At least one of the following functions has been outsourced in the five years before the survey yes/no: a) final production, b) intermediate production, c) R&D, d) IT, e) other activities. 
takeover Firms or division of other firms have been taken over in the five years before the survey yes/no 
merger Mergers have occurred in the five years before the survey yes/no 
sale_of_division Divisions have been sold in the five years before the survey yes/no 
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Table 3: Main results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
value_added_per_employee 
computer_user_share 0.010   0.038    
  (0.049)   (0.051)    
employee_voice*computer_user_share 0.036   0.052†   
  (0.033)   (0.034)    
workforce_training*computer_user_share -0.011   -0.022    
  (0.018)   (0.019)    
work_design*computer_user_share -0.027   -0.052**  
  (0.022)   (0.024)    
intranet_user_share   -0.033† -0.040*   
    (0.021) (0.022)    
employee_voice*intranet_user_share   -0.015 -0.020*   
    (0.012) (0.012)    
workforce_training*intranet_user_share   0.012* 0.015**  
    (0.007) (0.007)    
work_design*intranet_user_share   0.026** 0.032*** 
    (0.012) (0.012)    
employment_number -0.255*** -0.261*** -0.262*** 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.090)    
tertiary_share -0.002 -0.004 -0.001    
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)    
r&d_expenditures -0.006 -0.006 -0.006    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
non_ICT_investment 0.005 0.005 0.004    
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
foreign_owned 0.025 0.020 0.022    
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)    
price_competition_intensity -0.010 -0.011 -0.010    
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
non_price_competition_intensity -0.002 -0.004 -0.003    
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
_cons 13.309*** 13.259*** 13.353*** 
 (0.455) (0.454) (0.450)    
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes 
Industry-time fixed effects yes yes yes 
N 2743 2743 2743 
Groups 1282 1282 1282 
R2 within 0.18 0.18 0.18    
Log Likelihood -58.99 -55.68 -50.54    
 
Notes: see Table 2 for the variable definitions; standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the firm level (clustered sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, *, † denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% test level, respectively. As we fixed the organizational variables over time 
(see Section 4.2), we cannot identify the direct effect of organizational capital in our framework that controls for 
firm fixed effects. 
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Table 4: Test the effect of delayering and performance salary 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 value_added_per_employee 
computer_user_share 0.014 0.188 0.236* 0.241*   
 (0.059) (0.201) (0.125) (0.125)    
employee_voice*computer_user_share 0.035 0.058+ 0.064* 0.059+   
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039)    
workforce_training*computer_user_share -0.017 -0.036* -0.040* -0.029+   
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)    
work_design*computer_user_share -0.064*** -0.055** -0.034 -0.042+   
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.028)    
intranet_user_share -0.036+ -0.055 -0.078** -0.111**  
 (0.023) (0.058) (0.039) (0.043)    
employee_voice*intranet_user_share -0.017+ -0.018 -0.019 -0.021+   
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)    
workforce_training*intranet_user_share 0.014* 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
work_design*intranet_user_share 0.032** 0.033** 0.029* 0.029**  
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)    
delayering*computer_user_share 0.070                   
 (0.133) 
                  
delayering*intranet_user_share -0.032                   
 (0.033) 
                  
individual_performance_salary*computer_user_share  -0.027                  
 
 (0.045)                  
individual_performance_salary*intranet_user_share  0.000                  
 
 (0.013)                  
group_performance_salary*computer_user_share   -0.054+                 
 
  (0.033)                 
group_performance_salary*intranet_user_share   0.009                 
 
  (0.011)                 
firm_performance_salary*computer_user_share    -0.055*   
 
   (0.033)    
firm_performance_salary*intranet_user_share    0.017+   
 
   (0.010)    
_cons 13.070*** 13.338*** 13.335*** 13.358*** 
 (0.403) (0.512) (0.508) (0.511)    
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Industry-time fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
N 2672 2528 2528 2528 
Groups 1271 1271 1271 1271 
R2 within 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18    
Log Likelihood -19.89 -41.07 -37.83 -37.37    
 
Notes: see Table 2 for the variable definitions; standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the firm level (clustered sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, *, † denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% test level, respectively. As we fixed the organizational variables over time 
(see Section 4.2), we cannot identify the direct effect of organizational capital in our framework that controls for 
firm fixed effects. 
  





Figure 1: Contrasting the aggregated and the disaggregated perspective of 
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics based on main model (Column 3 of Table 3; N=2743) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
value_added_per_employee 223389.8 1525362 203.9462 7.70e+07 
computer_user_share 51.02807 29.68287 0 90 
intranet_user_share 34.92891 33.7027 0 90 
employee_voice .0048315 .4809734 -1.472656 1.700468 
workforce_training 30.24632 22.051 0 100 
work_design .0201474 .5889207 -.8692163 2.325401 
employment_number 411.9529 2281.753 20 45271 
tertiary_share 20.84069 17.76768 0 100 
r&d_expenditures 4604.858 15309.89 0 274261.6 
non_ICT_investment 21864.14 262298.6 0 1.19e+07 
foreign_owned .1917608 .3937577 0 1 
price_competition_intensity 3.994167 .9786016 1 5 
non_price_competition_intensity 3.098806 .9508932 1 5 
 
 















computer_user_share 0.3557           
intranet_user_share 0.2839 0.5251     
employee_voice 0.2669 0.3699 0.2938    
workforce_training 0.2352 0.3453 0.2792 0.2915   
work_design 0.1076 0.1808 0.2106 0.1237 0.2437  
employment_number 0.1228 0.1355 0.3215 0.1927 0.1333 0.1719 
tertiary_share 0.3038 0.4529 0.3272 0.2418 0.2826 0.1828 
r&d_expenditures 0.1290 0.2081 0.1599 0.1407 0.0681 0.2652 
non_ICT_investment 0.1575 0.0091 0.0417 0.0585 0.0878 0.0712 
foreign_owned 0.1775 0.2171 0.2105 0.1168 0.0806 0.1115 
price_competition_intensity -0.0565 -0.0053 0.0051 -0.0346 -0.0148 0.0640 
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intranet_user_share 0.2839 0.5251     
employee_voice 0.2669 0.3699 0.2938    
workforce_training 0.2352 0.3453 0.2792 0.2915   
work_design 0.1076 0.1808 0.2106 0.1237 0.2437  
employment_number 0.1228 0.1355 0.3215 0.1927 0.1333 0.1719 
tertiary_share 0.3038 0.4529 0.3272 0.2418 0.2826 0.1828 
r&d_expenditures 0.1290 0.2081 0.1599 0.1407 0.0681 0.2652 
non_ICT_investment 0.1575 0.0091 0.0417 0.0585 0.0878 0.0712 
foreign_owned 0.1775 0.2171 0.2105 0.1168 0.0806 0.1115 
price_competition_intensity -0.0565 -0.0053 0.0051 -0.0346 -0.0148 0.0640 






















tertiary_share 0.1239           
r&d_expenditures 0.1594 0.2480     
non_ICT_investment 0.1627 0.0401 0.1340    
foreign_owned 0.1073 0.1371 0.1122 -0.0682   
price_competition_intensity 0.0128 -0.0249 0.0151 -0.0659 0.0322  
non_price_competition_intensity 0.0765 0.0810 0.1867 0.0110 0.1177 0.0275 
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Table A.3: Testing alternative model specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
value_added_per_employee 
computer_user_share 0.027   0.039 0.036   0.049 
  (0.048)   (0.049) (0.048)   (0.049) 
employee_voice*computer_user_share 0.051†   0.067** 0.058*   0.073** 
  (0.033)   (0.030) (0.032)   (0.031) 
workforce_training*computer_user_share -0.011   -0.015 -0.012   -0.017 
  (0.016)   (0.018) (0.017)   (0.018) 
work_design*computer_user_share -0.005   -0.029 -0.008   -0.035† 
  (0.021)   (0.023) (0.021)   (0.023) 
intranet_user_share   -0.011 -0.018   -0.011 -0.019 
    (0.023) (0.024)   (0.024) (0.025) 
employee_voice*intranet_user_share   -0.016 -0.024†   -0.011 -0.020 
    (0.016) (0.016)   (0.016) (0.015) 
workforce_training*intranet_user_share   0.005 0.007   0.005 0.008 
    (0.008) (0.009)   (0.008) (0.009) 
work_design*intranet_user_share   0.029** 0.032**   0.031** 0.034*** 
    (0.012) (0.013)   (0.012) (0.013) 
employment_number -0.271*** -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.271*** -0.278*** -0.277*** 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) 
tertiary_share -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
r&d_expenditures -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
non_ICT_investment 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
foreign_owned 0.055 0.049 0.054 0.059 0.058 0.061 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
price_competition_intensity -0.016† -0.017† -0.016† -0.017† -0.018† -0.017† 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
non_price_competition_intensity -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
outsourcing    -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
    (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
takeover    0.016 0.017 0.017 
    (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
merger    0.002 0.001 -0.002 
    (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
sale_of_division    0.004 0.005 0.006 
    (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
_cons 13.305*** 13.325*** 13.332*** 13.307*** 13.343*** 13.337*** 
 (0.432) (0.426) (0.430) (0.443) (0.438) (0.441) 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry-time fixed effects no no no no no no 
N 2743 2743 2743 2692 2692 2692 
Groups 1282 1282 1282 1279 1279 1279 
R2 within 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Log Likelihood -282.44 -278.93 -276.28 -267.66 -264.14 -261.26 
 
Notes: see Table 2 for the variable definitions; standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the firm level (clustered sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, *, † denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% test level, respectively. As we fixed the organizational variables over time 
(see Section 4.2), we cannot identify the direct effect of organizational capital in our framework that controls for 
firm fixed effects. 
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Table A.4: Allow organizational variable to vary over time 
 value_added_per_employee 
computer_user_share 0.024    
 (0.034)    
employee_voice*computer_user_share 0.027    
 (0.023)    
workforce_training*computer_user_share -0.017    
 (0.011)    
work_design*computer_user_share -0.039**  
 (0.017)    
intranet_user_share -0.036    
 (0.023)    
employee_voice*intranet_user_share -0.020*   
 (0.012)    
workforce_training*intranet_user_share 0.014*   
 (0.008)    
work_design*intranet_user_share 0.017**  
 (0.008)    
employee_voice -0.059    
 (0.077)    
workforce_training 0.037 
 (0.034) 
work_design 0.111**  
 (0.052)    
_cons 13.260*** 
 (0.412)    
Control variables yes 
Firm fixed effects yes 
Industry-time fixed effects yes 
N 2743 
Groups 1282 
R2 within 0.19    
Notes: see Table 2 for the variable definitions; standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the firm level (clustered sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, *, † denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% test level, respectively. The control variables are the same as in the model 
of column 3 of Table 3 (i.e., employment_number, tertiary_share, r&d_expenditures, non_ICT_investment, 
foreign_owned, price_competition_intensity, non_price_competition_intensity). 
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Table A.5: Test interactions individually 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 value_added_per_employee 
computer_user_share -0.023 -0.006 -0.017                   
 (0.017) (0.043) (0.017)                   
employee_voice*computer_user_share 0.024                     
 (0.029)                     
workforce_training*computer_user_share  -0.004                    
  (0.016)                    
work_design*computer_user_share   -0.031†                   
   (0.021)                   
intranet_user_share    0.003 -0.033* 0.002    
    (0.006) (0.019) (0.006)    
employee_voice*intranet_user_share    -0.005                  
    (0.011)                  
workforce_training*intranet_user_share     0.012*                 
     (0.006)                 
work_design*intranet_user_share      0.025**  
      (0.011)    
_cons 12.856*** 13.395*** 13.498*** 13.202*** 13.244*** 13.384*** 
 (0.418) (0.333) (0.348) (0.387) (0.365) (0.370)    
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry-time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 4191 4361 4211 3977 4129 3996 
Groups 2556 2638 2556 2482 2555 2479 
R2 within 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18    
Notes: see Table 2 for the variable definitions; standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the firm level (clustered sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, *, † denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% test level, respectively. The control variables are the same as in the model 
of column 3 of Table 3 (i.e., employment_number, tertiary_share, r&d_expenditures, non_ICT_investment, 
foreign_owned, price_competition_intensity, non_price_competition_intensity). 
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Table A.6: Test subcategories of overall organizational variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  value_added_per_employee 
computer_user_share 0.072 0.127** -0.199* -0.139* 0.008 -0.113 -0.045 0.019 0.032    
 (0.051) (0.060) (0.114) (0.084) (0.071) (0.091) (0.088) (0.059) (0.061)    
employee_voice*computer_user_share 0.055† 0.057*                       
 (0.034) (0.034)                       
workforce_training*computer_user_share -0.032* -0.016 -0.022 -0.018 -0.007 -0.016 -0.014 -0.003 -0.004    
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)    
work_design*computer_user_share   -0.064** -0.052** -0.063** -0.063*** -0.064** -0.064*** -0.063**  
   (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)    
intranet_user_share -0.076*** -0.073*** 0.003 0.002 -0.011 0.019 -0.003 -0.023 -0.023    
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.036) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.027)    
employee_voice *intranet_user_share -0.016 -0.021*                       
 (0.011) (0.012)                       
workforce_training*intranet_user_share 0.018** 0.016** 0.012* 0.014** 0.011* 0.014** 0.012* 0.012* 0.011†   
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
work_design*intranet_user_share   0.032*** 0.028** 0.031*** 0.030** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)    
Alternative work design variables          
job_rotation*computer_user_share -0.003          (0.017)         
job_rotation*intranet_user_share 0.019**          (0.009)         
team_work*computer_user_share  -0.033**          (0.014)        
team_work*intranet_user_share  0.009*          (0.005)        
Alternative employee voice variables          
work_speed*computer_user_share   0.092*                      
   (0.049)                      
work_speed*intranet_user_share   -0.013                      
   (0.012)                      
task_sequence*computer_user_share    0.067**                     
    (0.033)                     
task_sequence*intranet_user_share    -0.016**                     
    (0.008)                     
task_assignment*computer_user_share     -0.004                    
     (0.028)                    
task_assignment*intranet_user_share     -0.008                    
     (0.010)                    
task_execution*computer_user_share      0.057†                   
      (0.038)                   
task_execution*intranet_user_share      -0.023**                   
      (0.009)                   
production_problems*computer_user_share       0.031                  
       (0.040)                  
production_problems*intranet_user_share       -0.013                  
       (0.011)                  
client_contact*computer_user_share        -0.011                 
        (0.020)                 
client_contact*intranet_user_share        -0.003                 
        (0.006)                 
client_complains*computer_user_share         -0.017    
         (0.021)    
client_complains*intranet_user_share         -0.002    
         (0.008)    
_cons 13.322*** 13.057*** 13.140*** 13.493*** 13.513*** 13.135*** 13.779*** 13.233*** 13.464*** 
 (0.407) (0.463) (0.433) (0.390) (0.383) (0.434) (0.394) (0.441) (0.406)    
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry-time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 2777 2746 2789 2797 2796 2799 2785 2794 2789 
Groups 1288 1283 1288 1288 1287 1287 1284 1287 1287 
R2 within 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18    
 Notes: see Table 2 for the variable definitions; standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level (clustered 
sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, *, † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% test level, 
respectively. As we fixed the organizational variables over time (see Section 4.2), we cannot identify the direct effect of organizational capital in 
our framework that controls for firm fixed effects. The control variables are the same as in the model of column 3 of Table 3 (i.e., 
employment_number, tertiary_share, r&d_expenditures, non_ICT_investment, foreign_owned, price_competition_intensity, 
non_price_competition_intensity).  
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Table A.7: Test direct measures for IT usage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 value_added_per_employee 
IT_intensity -0.033                       
 (0.054)                    
employee_voice *IT_intensity 0.019                    
 (0.029)                    
workforce_training*IT_intensity 0.010                    
 (0.017)                    
work_design*IT_intensity -0.043                    
 (0.031)                    
ERP_usage  -0.131 -0.026                  
  (0.095) (0.039)                  
employee_voice *ERP_usage  -0.013 0.005                  
  (0.068) (0.065)                  
workforce_training*ERP_usage  0.034                   
  (0.029)                   
work_design*ERP_usage  -0.022                   
  (0.074)                   
CRM_usage    -0.041                 
    (0.131)                 
employee_voice *CRM_usage    0.026                 
    (0.048)                 
workforce_training*CRM_usage    0.022                 
    (0.040)                 
work_design*CRM_usage    -0.052                 
    (0.046)                 
SCM_usage     0.030    
     (0.149)    
employee_voice *SCM_usage     0.077    
     (0.078)    
workforce_training*SCM_usage     -0.017    
     (0.045)    
work_design*SCM_usage     -0.154*   
 
    (0.089)    
_cons 13.303*** 13.305*** 13.293*** 13.278*** 13.308*** 
 (0.484) (0.490) (0.489) (0.497) (0.483)    
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry-time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
N 2738 2738 2738 2738 2738 
Groups 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 
R2 within 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16    
 Notes: see Table 2 for the variable definitions; standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level (clustered 
sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, *, † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% test level, 
respectively. As we fixed the organizational variables over time (see Section 4.2), we cannot identify the direct effect of organizational capital in 
our framework that controls for firm fixed effects. The control variables are the same as in the model of column 3 of Table 3 (i.e., 
employment_number, tertiary_share, r&d_expenditures, non_ICT_investment, foreign_owned, price_competition_intensity, 
non_price_competition_intensity). 
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Table A.8: Test different time windows 
 (1) (2) (3)    (4)    
 value_added_per_employee 
Time window: 2002-2011 2005-2011 2008-2011 2005-2008 
computer_user_share 0.038 0.074 0.057    -0.053    
 (0.051) (0.057) (0.100)    (0.131)    
employee_voice*computer_user_share 0.052+ 0.065* 0.027    0.073    
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.055)    (0.097)    
workforce_training*computer_user_share -0.022 -0.037* -0.026    0.001    
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.035)    (0.052)    
work_design*computer_user_share -0.052** -0.061** -0.108**  0.066    
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.051)    (0.069)    
intranet_user_share -0.040* -0.054** -0.077**  0.016    
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.036)    (0.063)    
employee_voice*intranet_user_share -0.020* -0.018 0.003    -0.002    
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.026)    (0.029)    
workforce_training*intranet_user_share 0.015** 0.021*** 0.027**  -0.010    
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)    (0.021)    
work_design*intranet_user_share 0.032*** 0.032** 0.055*   0.049*   
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.033)    (0.029)    
_cons 13.353*** 13.336*** 12.689*** 14.674*** 
 (0.450) (0.511) (1.035)    (1.178)    
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Industry-time fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
N 2743 2528 1631    1112 
Groups 1282 1271 1124    957 
R2 within 0.18 0.17 0.13    0.37    
Notes: see Table 2 for the variable definitions; standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level (clustered 
sandwich estimator) are in brackets under the coefficients; ***, **, *, † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% test level, 
respectively. As we fixed the organizational variables over time (see Section 4.2), we cannot identify the direct effect of organizational capital in 
our framework that controls for firm fixed effects. The control variables are the same as in the model of column 3 of Table 3 (i.e., 




Table A.9: Factor analysis: rotated factor loadings and unique variance 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
work_speed 0.7334 0.0946 0.0017 0.0344 -0.0711 
task_sequence 0.7399 0.2254 -0.0215 0.1041 0.0350 
task_assignment 0.5348 0.3172 0.0081 -0.0095 0.1494 
task_execution 0.7322 0.1134 0.0209 0.0531 0.0275 
production_problems 0.3834 0.4566 -0.0054 0.0692 0.0761 
client_contact 0.1652 0.8383 -0.0207 0.1129 -0.0145 
client_complains 0.1198 0.8806 -0.0286 0.0330 0.0654 
job_rotation -0.0371 -0.2289 0.0467 0.5706 0.4392 
team_work 0.0703 0.1795 0.2232 0.6958 0.0364 
workforce_training 0.1378 0.1921 0.0027 0.6961 -0.2073 
delayering 0.0297 0.0862 0.0505 -0.0312 0.8700 
individual_performance_salary 0.0352 -0.0920 0.7136 0.0631 -0.0803 
group_performance_salary -0.0261 0.0244 0.7868 0.1166 0.0677 
firm_performance_salary -0.0004 -0.0228 0.7943 0.0194 0.0804 
Statistics           
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: 0.7594     
Proportion of variance: 0.1517 0.1427 0.1297 0.0962 0.0751 
Eigenvalue: 3.13526 1.99131 1.14022 1.05953 1.01017  
 
 
